Incorporeal Things

In Law and War II I mentioned a division of things called “incorporeal things.” This article will explain that division, first using Justinian’s Institutes:

“1 Those are corporeal which in their own nature are tangible, such as land, slaves, clothing, gold, silver, and others innumerable.

2 Things incorporeal are such as are intangible: rights, for instance, such as inheritance, usufruct, and obligations, however acquired. And it is no objection to this definition that an inheritance comprises things which are corporeal; for the fruits of land enjoyed by a usufructuary are corporeal too, and obligations generally relate to the conveyance of something corporeal, such as land, slaves, or money, and yet the right of succession, the right of usufruct, and the right existing in every obligation, are incorporeal.

3 So too the rights appurtenant to land, whether in town or country, which are usually called servitudes, are incorporeal things.” (Justinian, Institutes. Book II.ii. trans. Moyle, J.B. D.C.L. Fifth ed: 1913.)

We see a similar passage in Bracton’s de Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae:

“There is another, a second, classification of things, for some are corporeal, others incorporeal. Corporeal are those that can be touched, [that is], immovables, as land, an estate, or movables, whether animate, as animals and such, or inanimate. Incorporeal things, such as rights, are those which can neither be seen nor touched, as a right of way over another's land, a right to drive beasts or conduct water over it and other such, which cannot be possessed only quasi-possessed.” (Bracton Online, Harvard. v. 2 p. 39 20-25.)

“Things may be classified in another way, of which something has been said above, [that is], some are corporeal, others incorporeal. Those are corporeal which by their nature can be touched, as land, a man, a robe, gold, silver, and many other things too numerous to mention. The words ‘by their nature’ are added because, though the thing itself cannot be touched, [either] because of mischance, because it has fallen into the depths of the sea, or because of difficulty, as a star fixed to the heavens, such things, though for the reasons aforesaid they cannot be touched, are nonetheless corporeal. Smoke and air are also corporeal, for air is one of the four elements of which all bodies are composed and created. It is that which is inhaled and exhaled from the body as wind and breath. Incorporeal things are such as are intangible, which exist in contemplation of law, as inheritance, usufruct, advowsons of churches, obligations, actions and the like. It is no objection to this that corporeal things are comprised in inheritance, usufruct and such, for what is due us under an obligation is in most cases corporeal, as land, a slave, money and the like, but the right of succession itself, that is, the right that is inheritance, is incorporeal. The same is true of the right to use and enjoy, the right of presentation, the right of obligation, and the right of rural servitudes. There are as well incorporeal things which do not exist in contemplation of law, as genera and species, good and evil spirits, the soul of the world and the souls of men.” (Bracton Online, Harvard. v. 2 p. 48 6-24.)

Therefore, incorporeal things cannot be seen or touched; they can only be heard about, for it is equally evident that we do not smell, taste or feel them. All rights (and wrongs) are incorporeal. We also note Bracton’s use of the phrase “by their nature,” which, again, could implicate developmentally disabled people, who cannot understand what is meant by this phrase, for example, they might not understand that a chest at the bottom of the sea, or a flag on the surface of the moon of earth, are “by their nature” tangible, even if they are not present to us immediately.

Bracton divides incorporeal things into two types: those that exist in contemplation of law, and those that do not exist in contemplation of law, that is, they exist in nature. Of these he mentions genera, species, good and evil spirits, and souls, which could also be translated minds. This phrase, “souls of men,” translates the Latin animæ hominum. This term, animae, or souls, appears in another place:

In anima enim sunt virtutes et iura
In the soul truly are virtues and rights. (Bracton Online, Harvard. v. 2 p. 27 4-5.)

In the soul, which is an incorporeal thing that exists in nature (not merely in contemplation of law), exist rights and virtues. The soul, or mind, therefore, is what contains entities that exist “in contemplation of law,” for the soul is the organ of contemplation.

Psychological Operations, therefore, will often involve deformation, or programming of the animae hominum in order to render them subordinate to military or political objectives. Here, we also see that Edward Coke’s “persons natural created of God” will have a soul given to them by God, and, therefore, a law given by God. Persons framed by the policy of man, on the other hand, have no soul; they exist only in contemplation of law. The corporation, or state, therefore, is a sort of subordinate creation.

And if we are, perhaps, more scientifically minded, and we dispense with the notion of natural persons, and a natural law, we can easily see that all incorporeal things that exist in contemplation are a product of Psy Ops, for they exist because someone has been taught to think in a certain way. This is, again, subject to the collateral attack of the mendacious individual who does not believe in nature: this natural division of things, into corporeal and incorporeal, if there is no natural obligation (obligations existing only in contemplation) to lying, then there is no requirement that the mendacious individual admit that the state is a corporation, and that corporations are mere figments of the imagination.